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Abstract
We develop a model of tax evasion based on the Ising model. We augment the
model using an appropriate enforcement mechanism that may allow policy makers
to curb tax evasion.
With a certain probability tax evaders are subject to an audit. If they get caught
they behave honestly for a certain number of periods. Simulating the model for a
range of parameter combinations, we show that tax evasion may be controlled ef-
fectively by using punishment as an enforcement mechanism.
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21 Introduction
Despite significant progress in expanding Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) seminal theoret-
ical paper to compensate for its weakness in predicting sufficiently high levels of individual
tax compliance, the way enforcement mechanisms work from a dynamic perspective still
needs further attention. Specifically, a new line of research is pursuing a multi-agent
based simulation approach (MABS), to analyse how different enforcement measures influ-
ence the compliance behaviour of individuals in complex systems, where possibly different
agents interact. A literature review of MABS-models regarding income tax evasion can
be found in Bloomquist (2006).
We find it especially worthwhile to investigate Allingham and Sandmo’s theoretical
prediction that both an increase in audit probability and an increase in tax penalty
enhance tax compliance. We perform our analysis in the light of group influence on
individual behaviour and find that both measures work to reduce tax evasion. Our study
is related to two other MABS-studies: Davis, Hecht and Perkins (2003) (DH&P) and
Bloomquist (2004), who develops a powerful tax compliance simulator (TCS), adressing
various possible triggers of tax evasion. Like DH&P we assume that tax payers who
are audited become honest upon audit. While Bloomquist assumes that an individual
becomes more risk averse when seeing someone in her network being audited, we equip
caught tax evaders with a memory. It reminds them to remain honest for a certain number
of time periods after non-compliance was detected. We interpret the enforced period of
honesty as a punishment. The severity of punishment obviously depends on the number
of periods detected tax cheaters need to remain honest for.
The importance we accord to group influence regarding an individual’s decision whether
to evade or not mainly stems from the work of DH&P, who stress that viewing others
evade a previously honest tax payer becomes susceptible to evasion with some probability.
The study of Korobow et al. (2007) also illustrates that especially group effects are im-
portant for an individual’s decision whether to evade or not. They find that the existence
of social networks diminishes compliance.
To further analyse how tax compliance develops over time when individual decision
making is subject to group influence we use the Ising model, a simple model from physics
describing how particles interact under different temperature levels. We find this modeling
framework particularly appropriate, because it attaches a large probability to a state in
3which an individual takes on the type that dominates her neigbourhood. To conform with
the Ising model, we assume that only two types of individuals exist, honest citizens and
tax evaders.
2 The model
We use a 1000 × 1000 grid square lattice, where in every time period each lattice site is
inhabitated by an individual (=spin Si) who can either be an honest tax payer Si = +1
or a cheater Si = −1 , trying to at least partially escape her tax duty. It is assumed
that initially everybody is honest. Each period individuals can rethink their behaviour
and have the opportunity to become the opposite type of agent they were in the previous
period.
The neighbourhood of every individual is composed of four people, agents to the north,
west, east and south. Each agent’s social network may either prefer tax evasion or reject
it. Various degrees
of homogeneity regarding either position are possible. An extremely homogenous
group is entirely made up of honest people or of evaders. No majority regarding either
position exists only when the neighbourhood is completely mixed up. This is the case
when two individuals repectively prefer each position.
Individual decision making depends on two factors. On the one hand, the type of
network every agent is connected with exerts influence on what type of citizen she becomes
in the respective period. On the other hand, peoples’ decisions are partly autonomous,
i.e. they are not influenced by the constitution of their vicinity. The autonomous part of
individual
decision making is responsible for the emergence of the tax evasion problem, because
some initially honest tax payers decide to evade taxes and then exert influence on others
to do so as well. How large the influence from the neighbourhood is can be controlled
through the “social temperature” parameter, T (units: J/kB).
Total energy is given by the Hamiltonian H = −∑<i,j> JijSiSj − B∑i Si. The sum
runs over all nearest neighbour pairs of spins, Si and Sj. Jij is the coupling between
spins, which we assume to be constant (Jij = J) for all neighbouring spins. B is a
positive parameter. It denotes the importance of the magnetic field for
4the total energy; in the tax evasion context it could be interpreted as the influence
of mass media, but we do not use it here (i.e. B = 0). The magnetisation is given by
summing the corresponding values of all spins (=
∑
i Si).
Ie = Si ·
(∑
j Sj
)
, multiplied by −J , denotes the energy resulting from the interaction
between the considered individual and her four closest neighbours. It is calculated by
adding up the products of the respective individual’s type (spin Si) and the type of
each of her four neighbours (spins Sj). It is known since decades that for T > Tc =
2/ln(1 +
√
2) ≈ 2.2 half of the spins are +1 and the other half −1, while for T < Tc there
is a majority for one direction.
We simulate the Ising model by performing a spin-flip only if a random number
between 0 and 1 is smaller than the normalised probability (p) of a spin-flip: p =
exp(−∆E/kBT )/(1 + exp(−∆E/kBT ).
The following table illustrates the probabilities of a spin-flip, given
a range of possible structures for the neighbourhood and the different temperature
levels we used in our simulations (cp. figures 1 to 4).
Temperature T
T = 0.25 T = 2.0 T = 2.5 T = 3.0 T = 25
Ie Probability of a spin-flip
Ie = −4 ≈ 1 0.982014 0.960835 0.935031 0.579325
Ie = −2 ≈ 1 0.880797 0.832019 0.791392 0.539915
Ie = 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Ie = 2 ≈ 0 0.119203 0.1679815 0.208608 0.460085
Ie = 4 ≈ 0 0.017986 0.0391655 0.064969 0.420676
The higher the level of the temperature is, the
more a probability near p = 1/2 is accorded to a spin-flip, regardless of whether it
implies a reduction (Ie = −4 and Ie = −2) or an increase in energy (Ie = 4 and Ie = 2).
On the other hand, the lower the temperature is (e.g. T = 0.25), the more certain it
becomes that flips, which cause energy to fall, take place and
that flips, which cause energy to rise, do not occur.
Finally, in the intermediate case where energy remains unchanged by a spin-flip (Ie =
0), the probability of a flip is equal to p = 1/2, regardless of the temperature level.
5Applied to tax evasion we can interpret the model as follows: Tax evaders have the
greatest influence to turn honest citizens into tax evaders if they constitute a majority in
the respective neighbourhood.
If the majority evades, one is likely to also evade. On the other hand, if most people in
the vicinity are honest, the respective individual is likely to become a tax payer if she was a
tax evader before. For very low temperatures, for instance T = 0.25, the autonomous part
of decision making almost completely disappears. Individuals then base their decisions
solely on what most of their neighbours do. A rising temperature has the opposite effect.
The individuals then decide more autonomously.
We further introduce a probability of an efficient audit (pa). If tax evasion is detected,
the individual must remain honest for a number of periods to be specified. We vary this
amount of time and denote the period of time that the caught tax evaders are punished
for by the variable k.1 One time unit is one sweep through the entire lattice. Appendix
A contains a Fortran source code for our model.
For background information on the Ising model and how to simulate it, see Stauffer
et al. (1988).
Already Fo¨llmer (1974) applied the Ising model to economics.
3 Dynamics of the model
We simulate tax evasion dynamics for various temperature levels and differently severe
punishments (k). When k equals zero, no punishment is present and the model describes
the baseline Ising model. Various degrees of punishment are introduced for different
temperatures, by setting k consecutively equal to 10 and 50 periods for all considered
levels of the temperature. The probability of an audit is sequentially increased in steps of
one percent, from 0 to 100 percent. For a given probability of an audit the dynamics of
tax evasion (measured as portion of the entire population) is depicted over the range of
300 time steps. Our three-dimensional illustrations thus depict 101 single time series, one
for each possible level of the probability of an audit. Additionally we use two-dimensional
illustrations to better convey the form of the tax evasion dynamics, when the probability
1By adding the number of tax evaders and honest citizens together in one time period, taking into
account the positive or negative sign every agent is marked with, one can also easily find the magnetisation
for each time period.
6of an audit is either at a realistic level (pa = 0.05) or at a rather high level (pa = 0.9).
— Figure 1 goes about here —
In figure 1 we set T = 25. If the penalty is high enough (e.g. k = 50), tax evasion can be
reduced to 0% in the short run, given that the probability of an audit is sufficiently high.
In the case of a penalty duration of 50 periods and a probability of an audit of 90% (left
panel in the second row of figure 1), within only a few periods each individual eventually
is compelled to remain honest. This happens, because spins flip relatively often at this
temperature, which is far above the critical level. The peaks we observe in the level of the
tax evasion, result from the fact that 90 percent of the initial large number of tax evaders
gets caught and after k iterations simultaneously becomes free to decide whether to evade
or not. Roughly half of them choose to become non-compliant again after being regiven
the opportunity to evade. Moreover consecutive peaks in non-compliance diminish less
over time and it takes longer until perfect compliance is established the further out on
the time scale the evolution of tax evasion is considered at. When allowing for more time
to pass, one can see that evasion eventually does not hit the mark of zero percent any
more. After around 8000 time steps an equilibrium level of about 2% non-compliance
is attained, because the number of agents who can freely decide which type to take on
stabilises at a level consistent with this portion of tax evasion.
If punishment is set equal to 10 periods (right panel in the same row) tax evasion only
approaches zero percent and finally comes to rest at a level of 9%.
Because the length of punishment now is too small to reach full compliance, the peaks
are somewhat greater than at k = 50: Additionally to those individuals who are released
after k periods from having to remain honest there now also exist other individuals who
may be tax evaders as well.2
In the two corresponding time series plots where k is equal to either 50 or 10 periods,
but the probability of an audit is much lower (pa = 0.05), one can describe the dynamics
similarly as above. Obviously the probability of an audit now is too low to reach full
compliance, even if k = 50 (cp. row three of figure 1). These two pictures illustrate well
2Some of the tax evaders who were not punished, because the duration of the punishment is too short
to establish full compliance, also remain tax evaders in the subsequent periods.
7that punishment is a suitable enforcement mechanism when the probability of an audit is
set to a realistic level. The more periods individuals are forced to remain honest in the
case of detection, the lower the resulting equilibrium level of non-compliance apparently
is. For k = 50 it is equal to 21% and for k = 10 the equilibrium level of tax evasion
amounts to 39%.
— Figures 2 and 3 go about here —
We also consider two other temperatures above Tc, T = 3 and T = 2.5. The lower the
temperature is, the slower adjustment towards the equilibrium in the baseline model oc-
curs (i.e. 50% non-compliance).3 As individuals become tax evaders more slowly the
tax evasion problem is less pronounced already from the beginning compared to higher
temperatures. But, because spins flip less frequently at lower temperatures, the same
enforcement mechanisms may work less efficiently in the short run than at higher tem-
peratures. When considering either of the time series with k = 50 and pa = 0.9 (at T = 3
or T = 2.5) one clearly sees that evasion cannot be reduced to zero percent any more.
On the other hand, if the temperature is at 25 everybody becomes an evader within only
a few periods, so that the enforcement mechanism quickly entails the entire population,
given that the probability of an audit is sufficiently high. Yet, for the considered low
temperatures T = 3 and T = 2, the enforcement mechanism does not encompass every
person any more, because it takes longer that all individuals once take on the type of a
tax evader.
Thus full compliance cannot be established any more in the short run. On the other
hand, when looking at the long-run, one can see that the equilibrium levels of tax evasion
are the lower the smaller social temperature is.
— Figure 4 goes about here —
Finally, for the sake of completeness, we also introduce a temperature level below Tc
(T = 2). At such low temperatures individuals seldomly decide to become non-compliant,
3The amount of time necessary for this equilibrium of the Ising model to be reached under different
temperatures can be read off in either of the three-dimensional illustrations in the figures 1 to 3, when
considering the evolution of the tax evasion over time, given that p is equal to 0%.
8because their vicinity which is mostly compliant on average exerts strong influence on them
to be honest as well. Therefore the equilibrium levels of tax evasion are smaller than at
higher temperatures. Obviously, also for this temperature a higher degree of enforcement
works to reduce non-compliance more.
4 Conclusion
Considering that individuals are likely to be influenced in their decision to evade taxes
by their immediate neighbours, we found that regardless of how strong group influence
may be, enforcement always works to enhance tax compliance. Both, a higher proba-
bility of an audit and a larger punishment work together to enhance tax compliance.
To exhaust the model’s explanatory power regarding how group influence affects overall
compliance, it appears interesting to perform a similar analysis for different initialisations
(e.g. everybody is dishonest in the beginning). Also, it seems interesting to consider if
and under what circumstances the system may show large fluctuations in tax compliance
and whether these effects can be controlled, with the aim of fixing compliance at a high
level.
We would like to thank Martin Hohnisch and Sabine Pittnauer for their valuable
comments and their time for fruitful discussions.
9Appendix A: Fortran source code for a single time series
1 ! Input data : L=1000,k=50,T=25,mcstep=300,p=0.9
2 program t ax eva s i on
3 implicit none
4 ! Dec lara t ion o f parameters and v a r i a b l e s
5 integer ,parameter : : L=1000
6 integer ,parameter : : both=L∗L
7 integer ,parameter : : Lmax=(L+2)∗L
8 integer ,parameter : : Lp1=L+1
9 integer ,parameter : : L2pL=L∗L+L
10 integer ,parameter : : L2p1=2∗L+1
11 real ,parameter : : T=25.0
12 integer ,parameter : : mcstep=300
13 integer , dimension (L∗(L+2) ) : : i s
14 real , dimension (−4:4) : : i e x
15 integer , dimension (L∗(L+2) ) : : mem
16 integer : : i e ,m, mc, hon , i , j , ev , k , ibm=1
17 real : : ex , p , ip
18 ! P r o b a b i l i t y o f an aud i t ( p ) i s s e t to 90%
19 p=0.9
20 ip =(2∗p−1.0) ∗2147483648.0
21 ! Number o f pe r i od s tax evaders need to remain honest i f aud i t ed ( k )
22 k=50
23 ! I n i t i a l i s a t i o n : Set everybody to honest and t h e i r memory to zero
24 do m=1,Lmax
25 mem(m)=0
26 i s (m)=1
27 end do
28 ! Spin− f l i p p r o b a b i l i t i e s
29 do i e =−4,4,2
30 ex=exp(− i e ∗2 .0/T)
31 i ex ( i e ) =(2.0∗ ex /(1.0+ ex ) −1.0) ∗2147483648.0
32 ibm=ibm∗65539
33 end do
34 write (∗ ,∗ ) p , 0 , 0
35 ! Dynamics o f tax evas ion i s s imu la ted over mcstep+1 time s t e p s
36 do mc=1,mcstep
37 ! Set counter o f honest i n d i v i d u a l s to zero
38 hon=0
39 do i=Lp1 , L2pL
40 ! F i r s t p e r i o d i c border c on s t r a i n t
41 i f ( i . eq . L2p1 ) then
42 do j =1,L
43 i s ( j+L2pL)=i s ( j+L)
44 end do
45 end i f
46 ! Audited tax evaders must remain honest f o r k pe r i od s
47 i f (mem( i ) . gt . 0 ) then
48 mem( i )=mem( i )−1
49 i s ( i )=1
50 else
51 i e=i s ( i ) ∗( i s ( i −1)+i s ( i +1)+i s ( i−L)+i s ( i+L) )
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52 ibm=ibm∗16807
53 i f ( ibm . l t . i e x ( i e ) ) i s ( i )=− i s ( i )
54 end i f
55 ! Counting the number o f honest c i t i z e n s
56 i f ( i s ( i ) . eq . 1 ) hon=hon+1
57 ibm=ibm∗16807
58 ! Each aud i t ed tax payer ob t a in s a memory
59 i f ( ibm . l t . ip . and . i s ( i ) . eq .−1) mem( i )=k
60 end do
61 ! Second pe r i o d i c border c on s t r a i n t
62 do j =1,L
63 i s ( j )=i s ( j+both )
64 end do
65 ! The number o f tax evaders
66 ev=both−hon
67 ! For the time s t e p s 1 to 300 p r i n t the same q u a n t i t i e s as f o r mc=0
68 write (∗ ,∗ ) p , mc , ev/ real ( both )
69 end do ! End time s t ep (mc) loop
70 end program t ax eva s i on
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Temperature: 25
k = 50 k = 10
k = 50, pa = 0.9 k = 10, pa = 0.9
k = 50, pa = 0.05 k = 10, pa = 0.05
Figure 1: In the first two pictures, the x, y and z-axis denote the probability of an audit pa (x), the
considered time period (y) and the corresponding tax evasion portion (z), respectively.
These two pictures thus show the tax evasion dynamics when holding the social temperature constant
at 25 and
when controlling for the number of periods (k) that a detected tax evader must remain honest for. If
either k or pa is equal to zero we get the standard Ising model. When k and pa are nonzero and positive,
the augmented version of the Ising model, i.e. our tax evasion model, applies.
The remaining four pictures visualise specific time series, by holding additionally the probability of
an audit at a constant level. We leave the length of punishment unchanged at either 50 or 10 periods and
depict the tax evasion dynamics for two different probabilites of an audit, i.e. pa = 0.05 and pa = 0.9.
Temperature: 3.0
k = 50 k = 10
k = 50, pa = 0.9 k = 10, pa = 0.9
k = 50, pa = 0.05 k = 10, pa = 0.05
Figure 2: Tax evasion dynamics when the
temperature is held constant at 3.
The same simulation design as in figure 1.
Temperature: 2.5
k = 50 k = 10
k = 50, pa = 0.9 k = 10, pa = 0.9
k = 50, pa = 0.05 k = 10, pa = 0.05
Figure 3: Tax evasion dynamics when the
temperature is held constant at 2.5.
The same simulation design as in figure 1.
Temperature: 2.0
k = 50 k = 10
k = 50, pa = 0.9 k = 10, pa = 0.9
k = 50, pa = 0.05 k = 10, pa = 0.05
Figure 4: Tax evasion dynamics when the
temperature is held constant at 2.
The same simulation design as in figure 1.
